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RESEARCH REPORT

DEFENSE COOPERATIONS OF MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE IN THE 1990's

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

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
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DEFENSE COOPERATIONS OF MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE IN 1990s

by

MALEK SHAHAR

Colonel, RMAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel David G. Kimball

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1990

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Defense cooperations of Malaysia-Singapore in 1990s.

AUTHOR: Malek Shahar, Colonel, RMAF.

Malaysia and Singapore have complex ethnic, economic, social and political make-ups which influenced their political-military cooperations. Ethnic enmosity and economic disparity brought mutual anxieties and apprehensions to socio-political sectors through rational and irrational perceptions of respective defence strategy and capability.

Singapore's de facto strategy of forward defence and some provisos under FPDA require Malaysia to compromise its territorial integrity. There is a need to allay these perceptions and improve understanding through close military cooperations. Tangible benefits in related economic-military interface could convince the socio-political sectors on the interdependent status of both countries, especially on the concept of defence indivisibility in a geographical entity.

This study discusses these inherent problems and analyses the viability of FPDA, the potential for a bilateral agreement and their benefits to Malaysia-Singapore security interests relating to social, economic and political issues.

In conclusion, this study supports the viability of FPDA. The permissive atmosphere offers strong potential to conclude the need for bilateral agreement and the socio-military interface in defence industries is required to benefit Malaysian national security interests.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Malek Shahar was a graduate of the Malaysian Royal Military College before being commissioned in the Royal Malaysian Air Force in August 1965, and completed his pilot training in September 1966. Since then, he has flown Twin-Pioneer, Provost, T-38, PC-7 Pilatus, CL-41G, MB-339 and F5E. He was upgraded to IP at Keesler AFB in September 1969. Operationally, he commanded the 6th Tactical FGA Squadron in 1972 and the 12th Tactical Fighter AD Squadron in 1980. He has served on the staff of the Operational Air Headquarters and the Prime Minister's Department in Kuala Lumpur between 1975-1978. He was also the Director of Plans at DOAF, Ministry of Defence from 1985-1987 before taking over the appointment of Base Commander, RMAF Butterworth near Penang. Colonel Shahar attended the residential course at ACSC and graduated in 1979, and the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College in 1982.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963, consisting of the peninsular Federation of Malaya, the island-state of Singapore, North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) and Sarawak. Two years later, Singapore seceded from Malaysia to become an independent nation.

The Malaysian peninsula forms the most southerly portion of the land mass of Southeast Asia with Singapore located at its tip. The two independent countries are linked by a narrow causeway across the Straits of Johore, but geostragically they are still a natural entity. Events in one country invariably have repercussions in the other. The whole of Malaysia and Singapore, in a geopolitical sense, is of vital strategic significance to the region.¹ For this reason, contemporary defence policy of either country must take into account mutual security interests which are synonymous with political and economic benefits.

The problems of separation were foreseen by Tengku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, when he explained to the Malaysian House of Commons in October 1961 regarding the decision to include Singapore in Malaysia that:

. . . national security and our mutual economy demanded that the two countries should work together. . . . We must prevent a situation in which an independent Singapore would go one way and the Federation another. . . .²

Tongka believed the strategic importance and economic interest of the nation outweighed the danger of probable Malay-Chinese conflict. History has recorded that Malaysia and Singapore still went their separate ways and continue to experience the inherent communal differences. The interracial tensions put in place by the events in history have remained a phobia for the two countries.

However, mutual interests in defence and security are reflected in statements by military leaders and those concerned with the subject. In November 1988, Mr. Goh Chok Tong, the First Deputy Premier and Minister of Defence Singapore, said,

... that Malaysia and Singapore will help each other if either is attacked is not in doubt as defence and security of the two countries are indivisible. . . ."

And yet--there has been no formal bilateral defence agreement signed between the two countries which supposedly have common defence and security interests. However, Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), but how viable is FPDA to secure the defence posture of the two countries through the 1990s? What is the potential for Malaysia-Singapore defence cooperation in a bilateral agreement? Could such a bilateral agreement with Singapore benefit Malaysian security interests?

This study will attempt to discuss these questions based on review of literatures concerning the defence perspectives of Malaysia and Singapore in the 1990s. The discussion will center on the political, social and economic

aspects of issues that could be harnessed to benefit the defence co-operations of both countries, more importantly Malaysia. Before addressing the questions, it is imperative to understand historical factors that cause the anxiety and apprehension between the two nations.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY HISTORY

The Malaysian peninsula and the island-state of Singapore were recorded by Marco Polo as the "Golden Chersonese". The word "golden" implied their significant location for future commercial or political interactions within the region.

The peninsula has been occupied by the Malays for many centuries. The earliest Malay political unit was that of Langkatuka which dated back to the second century A.D. and Sri Vijaya around the seventh century A.D.¹ These kingdoms were structured under the Buddhist cultural influence. For some five centuries these Buddhist-Malay empires controlled the trade network between the islands of Southeast Asia. They levied tributes from ships plying the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) between India and China.

In 1329, Sri Vijaya and its dependencies were vanquished by Majapahit, a Javanese-Hindu kingdom. The Malay Peninsula was subsequently subjugated under Hindu dominion and culture. This later influence had significant bearings on the structure of the Malay society and the acceptance of the Islamic faith.

The founding of the Sultanate of Malacca in 1401 marked the beginning of the modern Malay society.² The Malacca court created the "Malay world"—an area that includes the Malay

region of southern Thailand, southern Philippines, most of Indonesia, Borneo, the Malay Peninsula and the Malay population of Singapore. The earlier states of Langkasuka, Sri Vijaya and Majapahit constituted the cultural foundation upon which the Islamic Sultanate of Malacca arose to dominate Malay cultural values and political patterns for centuries.

The Portuguese became the first European power that dominated the region when they conquered Malacca in 1511 followed by the Dutch who ousted them in 1641. Both the Portuguese and the Dutch came for the lucrative spice trade (pepper, cloves, nutmeg and cinnamon). The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 saw Malacca being exchanged by the Dutch for the British colony in Bencoolen, Java.³ This treaty served to delineate the British and Dutch sphere of influence between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago respectively.

The strategic importance of the Malacca Straits and the island of Singapore were recognized by the British very early in their venture to the East, before the Treaty of 1824. The initial commercial intention found them controlling the strategic SLOCs through their possession of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. This collectively contributed to the protection of their stakes in India and China. The importance of these trading posts drew the British further into the peninsula.

During the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the development of the rubber and tin industries led the British to import large numbers of Chinese and Indian

workers into the region. By the 1940s, the Chinese made up 38.5% of the population in Malaya with Singapore having 75% of her 1.5 million people Chinese.⁴ The Malays were demographically no longer a clear majority in their own native country.

The British policy of indirect rule, governing the Malay states through the Sultans or other installed ruler, pacified the Malays while their rich homeland was exploited and ravaged by the foreigners.⁵ The end result was an economic disparity between the Malays and the Chinese, which continues to exist as the central issue in Malaysia and Singapore relations today. The revival of Malay nationalism in the 1930s nurtured the racial issue, with the Malays seeking economic status against Chinese pressure for political equality.⁶

The Japanese occupation of the region during World War Two further aggravated the racial tension.⁷ The Japanese administration favored the Malays and caused much resentment by the Chinese. After the war, racial apprehension and mutual distrust were manifested more strongly than ever in the political and social endeavors of the people. The predominantly Chinese membership of the militant communist insurgency reflected Chinese resentment against the Malay government. Thus nationalism developed along ethnic lines.

The Chinese nationalism in Malaysia and Singapore reaffirmed the principles espoused by Sun Yat Sen that, "All Chinese, no matter where they might be, were of one race and

one nation."⁸ Likewise some ultra Malay nationalists envisioned the realization of the united "Melayu Raya"--a Greater Indonesia or a Greater Malaya--the philosophy of bounding together in one political entity all the Malay Muslims in Southeast Asia.⁹ These two concepts created a collision course which pitted the two major races in the region against each other.

Malaya gained her independence from the British on 31 August 1957, but Singapore remained a British colony. Racial apprehensions in Malaya regarding the growing Chinese population was the main reason for not agreeing to merge with Singapore unless the ethnic natives of Borneo and Sarawak could provide a demographic buffer.¹⁰ This racial issue became the fundamental factor in the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 when the British decided to withdraw or disengage from direct colonial rule in Southeast Asia. The Malay-Chinese issue again caused Singapore to secede (or be expelled) from Malaysia on 8 August 1965.

Indonesia declared a state of confrontation against Malaysia and called the Malaysian government neocolonialist.¹¹ In reality, President Soekarno felt deprived of his long cherished dream of realizing the concept of "Melayu Raya". At the same time he was attempting to divert the attention of the Indonesian people from their domestic problems caused by economic disparities and communist activities. The confrontation had two impacts that are significant to this

analytical study. Firstly, the Indonesian militant activities helped cement Malaysian solidarity, although for just a while.¹² For the first time the people, regardless of race demonstrated their solidarity irrespective of their long existing ethnic differences. Unfortunately, the relationship between the Malaysian political leaders and their Singaporean counterparts deteriorated. Secondly, the British and their allies demonstrated their steadfast commitment to see the newly formed nation survive.¹³ The concept of indivisibility of Malaysia and Singapore was demonstrated by the British defence posture adopted to counter the Indonesian belligerent operations.

The 500 years history of the modern Malay era, dominated by colonialist activities, had fragmented the Malay population. The Malay entity was dissected into various geopolitical regions and had lost its economic heritage to the foreigners. The influx of the Chinese and Indian workers during the British colonial period compounded the problem with political and social challenges within the region.

The historical events had created a region with a plural population and political dominions of conflicting racial societies. Malaysia and Singapore inherited these problems along with the impact on their internal security and bilateral cooperation. The racial issue is dormant, but potentially volatile. It will continue to influence the perceptions of both internal and external threats for both countries.

CHAPTER III

MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE DEFENSE ENTITY

The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) was adopted in Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1963, specifically for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore by the members of the ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom) Treaty. Since May 1948, Australia and New Zealand were already committed to support the British and protect their possessions in the Malayan area through ANZAM, which referred to Australia, New Zealand and Malaya. The debacle created by the Japanese onslaught in January 1942 left bitter lessons that could not be easily forgotten by Britain and her allies.¹ Through AMDA, the British hoped to show their commitment and presence in the area. The forces stationed in Malaya and Singapore became part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) in the Far East. Article VI of AMDA stated that:

. . . subject to the proviso that the Government of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the Government of the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities on the Government may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the *preservation of peace in Southeast Asia . . .*² (Italics mine)

The ANZUK partners stood behind Malaysia through the period of confrontation with Indonesia. This confrontation was indirectly a British war since development of a Malaysian

military capability had just begun. The separation between Malaysia and Singapore in 1965 adversely affected defence cooperation between the two countries, which then began to formulate independent foreign policies that express their sovereignty.

The British were obviously disillusioned by the separation, but the clause, "for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia" in Article VI above committed them to continue honoring AMDA. The decision to withdraw completely from east of Suez in 1966 necessitated a new defence arrangement for Malaysia and Singapore based upon a collective defence organization. The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) was adopted in London on 16 April 1971.

In the new arrangement, there are three salient points pertinent to this analysis contain in the clause,

. . . to cooperate closely in defence arrangements which are based on the need to regard the defence of Malaysia and Singapore as indivisible, . . .³

and,

. . . in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relations to such attack or threat.⁴

Firstly, the FPDA allows for a very loose kind of commitment based on consultation. Secondly, it regards the defense of Malaysia and Singapore as indivisible in one geographical

entity, and thirdly, it recognises the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Malaysia and Singapore.

Although the arrangement is less binding, it provides an anchor of security from the ANZUK partners to the region. An Integrated Air Defence (IADS) headquarters was established to manage the composite defense of the two countries.⁵ When the Far East Command terminates on 1 September 1971, IADS was declared operational and assumed responsibility for the air defence (AD) of Malaysia and Singapore.

In 1970, before the adoption of FPDA, an integrated exercise was held in Malaysia and the British deployed their forces to the region to show their responsive capability. Since then, they have only returned to participate in September 1988, even though IADS conducts AD exercises four times a year. The exercise, codenamed "Lima Bersatu 88", saw a large commitment of personnel, aircraft and ships by all the members.⁶ The aim of the exercise was to test the interoperability of the participating forces in AD operations and to evaluate the maritime AD procedures. Its success was an achievement milestone for IADS and increased the credibility of the FPDA.

Under FPDA, the participating forces assume an integrated posture when the forces are delegated to Headquarters IADS or the ad hoc command and control team organised by the Five Power Naval Advisory Group. Otherwise,

the forces remained under the command of the respective national commanders. The integrated concept is a reminiscence of the joint command and control organisation which was effectively employed during the period of confrontation with Indonesia.⁷ Malaysia and Singapore have now built up their respective armed forces and have also developed their own AD headquarters to manage their sovereign airspace. The airspace is no longer "indivisible" but belongs to two sovereign nations.

Singapore, being an island-state with an area of 245 sq. miles, has small territorial airspace. It limits its armed forces to maneuver effectively. In AD, FPDA structured the Singaporean Track Production Area (TPA) to include part of Johore which is a Malaysian territory. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) fighters were also cleared to use the Malaysian low level flying area (LLFA) for tactical navigations. This arrangement conflicts with Malaysian unilateral security interests and the operational responsibility of the Malaysian Air Defence Commander.

These conflicts has ramifications in the command and control structure. The practice of appointing a senior officer from a third country as commander IADS seem to imply a dilution of Malaysian and Singaporean AD functions within their respective national airspace. The concept of integration works well within IADS which also provides the forum for multi-national interactions. Unfortunately, its utilisation is

more the exception than the rule. The maturity of the respective Malaysian and Singaporean AD forces require the issues that implicate them locally be resolved on a bilateral basis.

The need for a closer cooperation outside FPDA is not to belittle the multi-national organisation which definitely has credibility in political and deterrence substance. The analysis on its viability with regards to the defense of Malaysia and Singapore in a single geographical entity has implications into the complex, delicate and intertwined ethnic and social make-up of the two countries. It is important to understand these inherent problems which constitute threat that will affect the arrangement of defense in the future.

There is uncertainty facing the region in terms of security, although the trends favor regional stability. Therefore, it is appropriate at this juncture to review the issues that will influence these threats to Malaysia and Singapore, both externally and internally.

CHAPTER IV

THE THREAT: EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

The United States and the USSR presence in the region is neither surprising nor unexpected. Being superpowers, their concerns, interests and influences are likely to affect all parts of the globe. The geostrategic position occupied by Malaysia and Singapore makes their region a focal point for superpower projection strategy. As the popular Asian proverb says, "When elephants fight or make love, the grass suffers." In this context, Malaysia and Singapore will be the trampled grass if the big elephants take their violent courses.

However, recent events in the USSR have reduced the possibility of overt confrontations between the two elephants. Southeast Asia (SEA) is relatively low in the superpowers' order of regional priorities.¹ SEA ranks after Europe, the Western Hemisphere and Northeast Asia. It is also very unlikely that either superpower will directly engage in low intensity conflict (LIC) with any country in SEA. The US and USSR will not want to repeat their respective experiences of Vietnam and Afghanistan unless a situation directly impinges on vital strategic interests.

Additionally, both the US and the USSR are confronted by economic problems. The budget reductions and trade deficits are affecting the posture of US forces in the future, and the US is implementing force reductions by emphasizing quality

rather than quantity. The USSR is affected by the process of economic reforms. Gorbachev's pursuit of perestroika is likely to result in a much greater emphasis on trade and economic issues. However, his "new military defensive doctrine" is not being demonstrated in actual deeds, especially as regards their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. This situation was aptly observed by Admiral Huntington Hardisty, the Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Command who stated:

Since Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speeches and his subsequent address at the United Nations, his Pacific forces have improved qualitatively and quantitatively across the board The Soviet Pacific Fleet remains the largest of the Fleets in terms of surface ships and crafts, submarines, and aircraft. . . .²

This situation is presenting a strategic planning dilemma for the US vis-a-vis its power projection requirement. There is little that can be done by the smaller countries, except to seek shelter under the US strategic umbrella.

The Soviet acquisition of basing facilities in Vietnam has certainly enhanced their power projection capability in the region. The US is committed to counterbalance the Soviets' presence to keep the strategic posture in equilibrium. Malaysia and Singapore do not regard the Soviets as presenting a direct threat in the Straits of Malacca, unless they blocked the straits. The chance for such an event happening is remote as the SLOC is equally important to all other international users. Malaysia and Singapore can, therefore, rely on the

interests of international users to guarantee the security of the strategic SLOC.

The presence of a growing Peoples Republic of China (PRC) blue water navy is another factor in the external threat to the region. The PRC is showing an interest in asserting control of a 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) owing to the present development and future potential in off-shore oil deposits, plus other minerals such as manganese nodules. The Sino-Vietnamese clash in March 1988 over the Spratlys demonstrated that the Chinese are not hesitant to use military power to secure their territorial interests.³

Malaysia has also become a party to the South China Sea controversy by virtue of its proximity to the region. The many disputed claims around the Spratlys have implications for Malaysia's maritime boundaries and the EEZ. In 1979, Malaysia produced a map declaring an EEZ which overlapped those claimed by China, Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. The conflicting claims among the Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries have been resolved, at least for the moment, through bilateral arrangements agreed upon by the affected parties. On 27 June 1988, the Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan announced in the Malaysian Parliament that Malaysia had positioned troops on three of the reefs namely Turumbu Layang Layang, Turumbu Mantanani and Turumbu Ubi.⁴ This placed Malaysia in the midst of the volatile dispute and in confrontation with the Chinese and Vietnamese.

History records that nations have gone to war over such territorial disputes. In this case, the unresolved claims create the potential for ideological, racial and economic conflict.

Apart from the disputes in the Spratlys, Malaysia has always regarded the PRC as the principal threat to the region. Despite the diplomatic relations established with Malaysia in 1974, the PRC continued to support the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) guerillas in the Malaysian jungles.⁵ Singapore was cleared of the MCP menace in December 1950 when the Communists failed in their bid at urban revolution.⁶

However, the incidents in Tien An Men Square in June 1989 may change Malaysia's perspective. This was followed by the recent mass surrender of the Malaysian Communists guerillas to the Thailand government authorities on 2 December 1989, after 41 years of futile struggle to set up a Communist regime in Malaysia.⁷ The surrender could very well support the thesis that the communist ideology is dead. However, it is too early to predict the exact motive of the surrender. If the MCP leadership has admitted total defeat, then Malaysia will have one less threat to contend with.

For the moment, the strategic equilibrium is being maintained by the two superpowers, notwithstanding China's interests, and they are indirectly providing the stability much cherished by the smaller states. Malaysia and Singapore would want to see the status quo maintained instead of being

dominated by any single power, especially the Soviets. This is because they fear the Vietnamese regime will renew its expansionist ambitions. If a post-Kampuchean setting will render the SEA region devoid of superpower rivalries and free from military conflicts, then the perceived threat from communist powers to the north would also diminish. A stable environment will definitely contribute to the concept of a Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality (ZOPFAN),⁶ although in the true sense of the words "Freedom" and "Neutrality" may become misnomers. Small nations seldom have the option to exercise total freedom and genuine neutrality since superpower interests will relegate regional aspirations to a lower precedence. It is best to optimize the prevailing atmosphere for the benefit of the region.

A US withdrawal from basing facilities in the Philippines could unbalance the power equilibrium in the region. Insular South East Asian (SEA) countries are sceptical that the vacuum would be readily filled by the Soviet. The PRC could also project its influence into the area with the silent concurrence of the US. Recently the US has been very sensitive in their dealings with the Chinese so as not to disrupt leverage in containing the Soviets.⁷ The concern for continuing the regional strategic balance has induced Singapore to offer military basing facilities to the US. However, Malaysia and Indonesia are concerned that the offer results in another ASEAN member accommodating US forces in the region.

Needless to say, the US has been utilizing the bunkering, repair and rest and recreation facilities in Singapore ever since they withdrew from Vietnam.

A formal US-Singapore bilateral military agreement is considered contrary to the aspiration of ZOPFAN which Malaysia advocated.¹⁰ Singapore's action was unilateral and depicted a motive not conducive to ASEAN solidarity and cordial Malaysia-Singapore relations. The action created a perception among some secular Malaysians that Singapore is attempting to consolidate security insurance against the possibility of being "surrounded and engulfed by the Malay nations."¹¹

The possibility of military conflicts in the Southeast Asian region within this century is remote as long as superpowers' influence remains at status quo. Looking back at history, the only external conflicts over the last 35 years in SEA were that of Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia in 1963-65, Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea at the end of 1978, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February-March 1979.¹²

Malaysia and Singapore must continue to foster the regional stability by addressing their inherent internal conflicts in politics, economics and social/cultural which are also factors that influence threats. The containment of this category of threats depends largely upon the ability of the respective governments to pacify the existing plural society. Therefore, it is appropriate for this study to also consider the internal threat influences.

CHAPTER V

THE THREAT: INTERNAL INFLUENCE

Perceived internal threats will always have a basic ethnic flavor when considered within the geopolitical perspective of Malaysia and Singapore. While Malaysia was combating the communist terrorists, Singapore was enjoying cordial, but informal relations with the PRC, even though the Singaporean political leadership also considered China as a long term threat to the region.¹ Singapore's reluctance to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC could be, firstly, to avoid the "third China" image of Singapore within the Malay dominated region. Secondly, since the informal relationship provided adequate contacts, why bother to seek formal diplomatic relations. The fact is that the Sino-Singapore Chinese ethnic linkages have allowed the present informal but cordial arrangement to prevail.

In the political arena, the parties that currently dominate the respective governments are ethnically oriented. Therefore, the leaders of these plural societies are faced with a challenge to compromise and avoid prejudice on inter-racial issues. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) of Malaysia seeks to secure the economic position of the Malays in Malaysia. In 1971, the government launched a New Economic Policy (NEP), a twenty year program to elevate the Malay's economy and secure at least 30% of the country's corporate

entrepreneurship.² A report in 1989 indicated that the target is still not achieved.³ This issue has been indiscriminately used by political opposition groups to secure non-Malay votes in general elections. Political rallies had often incited racial antagonism among the major races, especially between the Malays and the Chinese. This ethnic conflict has created a potential internal threat, and demands delicate, but firm, actions by the government.

The racial riots of 1964 in Singapore and 1969 in Malaysia were incidents which threatened internal security, and were the results of unscrupulous racial agitation by irresponsible elements.⁴ Unfortunately for the people of Malaysia and Singapore, these incidents left a scar of racial tension that has kept mutual anxiety and apprehension alive between the Malays and the Chinese. The Internal Security Act (ISA) was enacted in 1971 by the Malaysian Parliament, after the tragic racial clashes of 1969. The Act allows individuals who manipulate sensitive issues to further their political objectives and self interests to be detained without trial.

The unhealthy relationship has also had a ramification on the respective governments' structure; this is most evident in the armed forces. The Malaysian government imposed an informal racial quota to secure the dominance of the Malays in government and military hierarchies. Singapore was more candid when Brigadier General Lee Hsieng Loong, Singapore's Second Defence Minister, explained on 22 February 1987 why the Malays

in Singapore were discriminated against in key military positions. He said:

If there is a conflict, if the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is called to defend the homeland, we don't want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for the nation may be in conflict with his religion.⁵

His candidness was overstated, although few could blame him for the lingering anxiety about a possible conflict with Malaysia.

Malaysia formulated her foreign relations with an objective of making as few enemies as possible. The objective is to maintain peaceful conditions for economic progress and development.⁶ In fact, Malaysia has never been aggressive, but has always searched for peaceful solutions. History records that Malaysia gained her independence in 1957 from the British through peaceful negotiations and Malaysia was the leading advocater of ZOPFAN. The Malays culture has always been nurtured on peaceful coexistence, but can turn aggressive when pushed against the wall.⁷ In this context, the fear harbored by Singapore of a possible "reunification" effort by Malaysia is based more on assumptions rather than on a rational assessment of political trends and national behavior.⁸ A forceful "reunification" of the two countries is the last thing Malaysia's Malay political leaders want.

No doubt the ethnic irritant in political and social sensitivities will forever be present in Malay-Chinese issues, but the geographical similarity and the kith-and-kin ties on both sides of the causeway will also form an unbreakable link

between the two countries. For these reasons, both countries must be sensitive to the other's social makeup. For example, Singapore in 1967 disregarded this sensitivity when they brought in Israeli instructors and advisors to help them structure their armed forces. This caused concern in Malaysia and a fear that the Arab-Israeli conflict was being introduced into the region. Singapore was conscious of the fact that Malaysia is a Muslim state and a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) which seeks to promote solidarity and progress of the Islamic community.⁹ Malaysia backed the rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination, and therefore, detests any relationship with the Zionist regime. In November 1986, Singapore again welcomed an official visit by Israeli President Chaim Herzog, which again brought about public protests by various groups in Malaysia.

In October 1989, activist groups from both sides of the causeway joined in verbal accusations over the US basing facilities in Singapore. The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) youth protested against the Singapore government that the permanent US presence in Singapore could affect peace and stability in the region.¹⁰ The Malay groups in Singapore also protested, fearing the offer would bring American political intrigue and social values into the country. In the worst case, Singapore will become a target of other foreign elements who oppose the way the Americans are handling conflicts in West Asia and other regions. The Singaporeans

responded by telling the Malaysians not to interfere in the republic's internal affairs, and countered with a call to strengthen bilateral ties. These types of incidents are irritants which cause unnecessary friction and should be avoided.

It is granted that Malaysia and Singapore will have different foreign policy platforms and that Malaysia should not dictate Singapore's policy. For the sake of bilateral interests and internal security, Singapore could attempt to be more sensitive in tailoring her foreign policy by not exacerbating political and social issues of her immediate neighbor. Malaysia has espoused a foreign policy of diplomatic friendliness. Singapore should reciprocate with a willingness to suppress irritants and help to allay mutual apprehensions.

These mutual anxieties and apprehensions continue to influence the ethnic values of the Malays and the Chinese. This animosity, if allowed to continue, will manifest itself as security problems. Currently animosities are somewhat cushioned through the various forums and associations of which the two countries are members. ASEAN stands as the principal forum that brings the leaders of SEA together to solve regional and common internal problems. ASEAN was formed to promote the economic and cultural well-being of the member nations, and it has certainly promoted stability in regional security.

From a military perspective, the notion that Singapore would employ a preemptive strike on Malaysia sounds ridiculous,

but the Singaporean concept of forward defence and their military capability suggests a possibility of doing so. Singapore's leaders have indicated that they would not hesitate to cross into Malaysia if their security is threatened.¹¹ Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) may take the initiative if the survival of the nation is at stake, but with the result that Malaysia responds to protect its own survival. It will be tragic for both countries if such an option is exercised.

Conditions which Singapore would view as a grave threat are, firstly, the event that Malaysia falls into the control of Muslim fundamentalists, and secondly, if the Scudai or Kota Tinggi reservoirs which are Singapore's water supply are contaminated or polluted. Singapore's fear of Islamic extremism is unfair to the present Malaysian government since the UMNO leadership opposes such extremism whether from internal or external sources. The Malaysian government in power is resolved to follow the Islam of moderation and of enlightenment.¹² The act of sabotaging the reservoirs to secure political or military objective is beyond rational means given the cordial atmosphere enjoyed by Malaysian and Singaporean leaders at regional forums, the kith-and-kin ties and the potential condemnation of the regional and world community. The act of sabotage by radical groups fall into a different category and such occurrence will be the concern of both nations. Under these circumstances, what is required is an emphasis on the survival of both nations based on a closer

defense cooperation. The closer rapport may even overcome the ethnic anxiety and apprehension to the betterment of both parties in containing internal threats.

CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENT AFTER SEPARATION

The separation in 1965 from Malaysia was regarded by Singapore as an expulsion rather than an act of secession from the two year old Federation.¹ Singapore was bitter when forced to undertake the task of development on its own without the benefits of the hinterland and natural resources. The bitterness was compounded by a feeling of vulnerability from her unpredictable neighbor. Conversely, the atmosphere of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia was also capable of suddenly changing into "euphoric rapprochement" such as that on 27 May 1966 which "revived strong sentiments of blood-brotherhood with Indonesia."² At that time, Singapore considered herself fortunate that the British presence under the commitment of AMDA had temporarily assured her security, but later suffered discomfort when the British confirmed their military withdrawal from east of Suez.

Singapore developed her defence forces from scratch, and the issue of racial polarization led Singapore to perceive a close relationship between her external and internal security. As a result, Singapore adopted a strategy of mobility and forward defence, to compensate for her lack of geographical depth. Singapore embarked on an elaborate program to develop a conventional defence posture designed to attack beyond her urbanized island-state. This was achieved through

the procurement of the appropriate military equipment. To date, Singapore has acquired a deterrent posture which has been compared to a "poisonous shrimp." The analogy suggests that it is "unpalatable for any would be aggressor to take a bite of the morsel."³

The success of this military buildup was directly related to the perceived Malay threat and resources from a booming economy. In 1966, the initial development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) took 26.4% of the total budget. Singapore also received as a withdrawal package from the British, a sophisticated radar system at Bukit Gombak, including Bloodhound missiles which formed the nucleus of her ground Air Defence (AD) system. In 1972, her defence estimates rose to 38.9% of the total budget, but thereafter began to taper off to a figure of 16.5% in 1978.⁴

Between 1983 and 1985, Singapore once again embarked on procuring expensive weapons in its effort to upgrade her AD capability. Four E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Warning and Command (AWAC) aircraft, eight F-16A fighter aircraft and thirty SIAI Merchetti trainer aircraft were purchased for a total estimated cost of over S(Singapore)\$2.7 billion.⁵ This estimate reflects an increased of 22.6% in defense expenditure from 1983 to 1985, but it does not reflect the share of the defence spending in the total national budget for those years. It was not a difficult defence procurement for Singapore with an economy that almost quadrupled since the separation in 1965. From 1960

to 1983, the economic growth averaged 9.3% while the total value of gross fixed assets increased from S\$3.6 billion in 1960 to S\$67 billion in 1985. From a modest beginning of only two under-strength infantry battalions in 1966, the SAF now stands at 55,500 with 45,000 in the Army, 4,500 in the Navy, 6,000 in the Air Force, and some 212,000 in the Reserve Forces.* The army has expanded to a balanced force of one active and three reserve divisions with supporting arms and services. Considering Singapore's 2.6 million population and size, it has an enormous army of 350 AMX-13 tanks and about 1000 armored personnel carriers (APCs).

The Singapore Navy operates a modest assortment of fast attack craft and two elderly ex-US Redwing class coastal minesweepers. Singapore, as an island state, needs to protect her waters and harbors, but the presence of Landing Ship Tanks (LST) and other amphibious vessels are viewed with concern by her neighbors. This type of equipment gives Singapore the potential for aggression that could threaten Malaysian interests and survivability.

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) inventory further enforces those fears. Some seventy-six A-4 Skyhawks aircraft are in service and undergoing various stages of modifications and update. The Skyhawks will be the main force to carry the attack role with capabilities in anti-shipping and, possibly, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), too. Singapore also operates four C-130Bs, which are convertible to tankers,

providing aerial refueling for both the strike and AD aircraft. The four E-2C Hawkeye AWAC aircraft gave the island state an effective AD surveillance for extended low-level target acquisition to almost 300 miles.⁷ The AWAC aircraft can integrate the control of the forty-two F-5E/F fighters and the eight F-16As, commissioned in late 1989, to provide a viable AD cover and intercept capability against aerial intruders. Area and point defences are currently covered by the BAe Bloodhound Mk2, BAe Rapiers, the improved Raytheon HAWK systems and the Bofors RBS-70.

Based on capabilities alone, the inventory definitely causes concern in Malaysia. However, Malaysians can allay their fear and anxiety with positive analysis of Singapore's defense strategy. Singapore is merely demonstrating her will to survive and has postured her forward defence strategy with surveillance equipment that provide time and space to compensate for her lack of geographical depth.

While Singapore was continuing its impressive defence development, Malaysia was preoccupied with a communist insurgency that attempted a second resurgence from their sanctuaries in the Thailand-Malaysian border. Although the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) had a head-start over Singapore in its development, its forces were primarily developed for internal security to combat the immediate threat of insurgency. Development of a conventional defence posture was only undertaken after the US defeat in Vietnam. The subsequent

Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, and the convincing "Domino Theory" led to the first serious reorganization to develop a conventional capability. The result was the massive PERISTA (PERkembangan IStimewa Angkatan Tentera) plan or Special Expansion Plan of the armed forces costing M(Malaysian)\$9.1 billion.⁸ Development in maritime capability was also undertaken when Malaysia declared an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in April 1980.⁹ Unfortunately, the recession of 1984 affected the total implementation of the plan.

The economic slowdown was possibly the most severe since the depression experienced by Malaysia in the 1930s. Defence allocation alone was cut by 30.4% as the Malaysian government de-emphasized the military dimension and placed greater emphasis on the development of national resilience and on diplomacy to preserve the national security. Dr. Mahathir, the Prime Minister, in his address to the Global Community Forum in 1984 stated:

We in Malaysia believe that the first line of defence of any country is not its military capability. The first line of defence lies in its national resilience and in shaping strategic environment where threats are minimised. It lies in the policy of making friends with those who want to be friends with us.¹⁰

This doctrine caused concerned for the military commanders, but overall it was a sound strategy when a choice had to be made between defence and development. It was a bold decision for Malaysia to not sacrifice socio-economic

development for defence procurement in times of economic hardship, while her neighbor proceeded with expensive defence purchases. Nevertheless, the concern about security is always foremost with Prime Minister Mahathir, and it is evident that the military will continue its development when the economy recovers. Malaysia has recently completed negotiations with the British government for the procurement of a defence package worth more than 1.5 billion pounds sterling. The procurement package could include eight Panavia Tornados and two Oberon-class submarines.¹¹ Malaysia will develop her armed forces based on what is affordable and what she requires to contribute to regional security. There is no intent to participate in a regional arms race, which she could ill afford.

In mid 1988, Mr. Goh Chok Tong stated at a Ministry of Defence seminar that:

. . . managing *good relations with our neighbours* is as important as the improvement we seek in our defence capability . . . good relations has benefits for all, but it does not mean replacing defence capability with diplomacy. The two must move in tandem. . . . ¹²(*italics mine*)

This statement regarding defence policy stands in stark contrast with that made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in 1984. Nevertheless, Mr. Goh's statement included the message that Singapore should go forward in the spirit of "good relations with our neighbors."¹³ The equally important message on defence policy is justified for Singapore's security

requirements and can be viewed as a contribution to collective regional security.

Singapore's defence capabilities support its philosophy of total defence. The development in defence was equally supportive of economic development, which she pursued in earnest. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) complementing Singapore International Airlines (SIA), and allied service industries contributed to the Singaporean economy. Roles and tasks which are common to military and civilian sectors are shared, but necessary restrictions were imposed. For example, pilots, engineers and navigators from the SIA and air traffic controllers from the Civil Aviation Authority were called up through the Enlistment Act to contribute to the well-being of the RSAF.

Another economic-military interface to support the total defence concept is the growing armament and aerospace industries. The need for survival has forced Singapore to undertake defence industrialization in order to build a national defence capability.¹⁴ The Sheng-Li Holding Company was formed by the government to manage the activities of the Singapore Aircraft Industries (SAI), Singapore Technological Corporation (STC), and Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering (SSE).

The aerospace industry is a high-value and skill-intensive industry which received the full commitment of the government. The aerospace industry was identified as a

priority in the early 1970s to buildup the RSAF and to provide servicing facilities for USAF aircraft.¹⁵ The SAI has served Singapore well both economically and militarily. The Singapore Aerospace Maintenance Company (SAMCO), a subsidiary of SAI, refurbished the A-4 Skyhawks and currently is upgrading the aircraft for the RSAF. In 1985, the company also assembled the fleet of SIAI Merchetti 211 jet trainers and the Super Puma helicopters. Their military-economic integration is commendable since it has successfully exploited the connections between procurement of military aircraft from abroad and related domestic industrial activities.

The STC also has subsidiaries that contribute to their economy. The Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS), founded in 1969, was a Colt licensee which produced and equipped the SAF with M-16 rifles. By the late 1970s, the CIS had produced excess rifles, but found difficulties in exporting without approval from the US State Department.¹⁶ In view of the shortcomings and problems of third-party sales, the CIS decided to produce its own weapons, which are far better and yet cheaper than the M-16. Singapore produced the SAR-80 assault rifle and later developed the Ultimex-100 light machine gun.

In 1973, Singapore incorporated the Ordnance Development and Engineering (ODE) company which specializes in the overhaul, development and manufacturing of medium and large calibre weapons.¹⁷ Today, it is involved in many specialized activities including manufacture barrels and 120mm mortars, and

overhauling 35mm anti-aircraft guns and the 155mm howitzer. ODE has also developed extended range mortar bombs for 60mm, 81mm and the 120mm caliber weapons.

The large inventory of tanks and APCs necessitated the development of a capability to provide depot level maintenance of these vehicles. Singapore Automotive Engineering (SAE) was formed in 1971 to acquire the required capability. The SAE has recently begun to retrofit vehicles, including the installation of the RBS-70 surface-to-air missile system on the V200 APCs and surveillance radars on 10-ton trucks.¹⁸

The shipbuilding and naval maintenance capabilities were also advanced by the SSE. Singapore strategic harbors and facilities guarantee her dominance in this area. These facilities have been used by American naval ships since they lost facilities in Vietnam. These facilities are now creating a regional controversy after they were offered to the US Navy for permanent usage.

Malaysia's defence industry has also been developed under a conscious government policy of semi-privatization of government owned facilities.¹⁹ However, in Malaysia these industries were initially developed solely for the military without the military-economic connections as established by Singapore. The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Aircraft Repair and Overhaul Depot (AIROD) was developed at the same time the Singapore SAI was established. Unfortunately, AIROD was left entirely to the RMAF without any interface with the

Malaysian industry. In 1984 the facilities were semi-privatized as part of a joint venture between the Malaysian government and US Lockheed of Georgia.²⁰ Later, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) dockyard developed in Lumut was made available for commercial repair work through the Malaysian Shipyard Engineering (MSE), which is a joint venture between Malaysia's Hong Leong Shipbuilding Company and Lurssen of Germany. Other joint ventures have been developed in the electronic industry, the most notable one for defence being with Italian Marconi. As part of the effort to become more self-reliant, Malaysia has also developed an Armed Forces Manufacturing workshop to undertake major repair and maintenance of heavy fighting vehicles, similar to the SAE. An ammunition manufacturing factory and a small arms assembly plant were also developed, but their progress has not matched that of Singapore.

Singapore has reached a high level of development, especially in defence industries, to support her policy of self-reliance. The resultant industrial development has positively supported their defence philosophy. Malaysia and the neighboring countries could gain much from the successes achieved by Singapore. But a key question is whether Singapore will share these successes with Malaysia?

CHAPTER VII

THE BENEFITS OF A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT

The prospect for regional peace should not lull Malaysia and Singapore into complacency regarding their relationship. It must not be taken for granted that their respective internal stability will continue without efforts from both sides to build better relations. It would be easy for sensitive incidents to be blown out of proportion and damage relations between the two neighbors. As in the past, activist groups can exploit a situation to recreate tensions. An increase in tensions is the last thing that either country wants.

The benefit of mutual understanding was demonstrated when the US basing issue in Singapore was resolved through cordial discussions between Dr. Mahathir and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. The Singapore Prime Minister has assured his Malaysian counterpart that there will be no permanent basing of US military forces in Singapore. However, his statement issued on 18 October 1989, said that, "Singapore offered an expanded use of its maintenance and repair facilities."¹ Malaysia accepted the assurance that Singapore's action was based purely on business transactions. Both the leaders then stressed the need for officials from the two countries to get to know each other better to avert future misunderstanding.

The economic prosperity currently enjoyed by both countries, especially Singapore, is another positive effect of cooperation which tends to reduce economic tensions. Singapore has long realized the necessity for her neighbors to achieve a degree of political stability and economic progress because she fully understood the inherent dangers to her prosperity and survivability from internal instability. In 1971, Singapore strengthened her joint economic cooperation with Malaysia by signing an agreement concerning the exchange of overseas market information, the shared use of expert agents, and cooperation in third country trades.² It is obvious that Singapore sees the benefit to continue building amicable ties with Malaysia.

Malaysia also needs Singapore economically. As natural trading partners, the countries are interdependent. Singapore is currently Malaysia's second largest trading partner after Japan. In terms of trade balance with Singapore, in 1989 Malaysia exported 19.3% of her gross exports worth M\$ 10.698 billion to Singapore.³ In return, Singapore's products constituted 13.2% of Malaysia's gross imports worth M\$ 5.73 billion which gave Malaysia a positive trade balance with Singapore. Malaysia is implementing an aggressive economic policy with, "A clear understanding and determination to create an ambience conducive to long-term economic prosperity."⁴ It has been projected that Malaysia will prosper industrially in the 1990s. The prospect is encouraging based on the report of 1988 by the Bank Negara (National Bank) of Malaysia that,

. . . there has been an overwhelming response of investors to the Government's efforts to promote greater private initiative in its drive towards greater industrialisation. . . .⁵

As discussed earlier, Singapore has successfully developed defense industries which are blended harmoniously into her economy.⁴ Those industries support her war fighting capabilities and provide a large measure of self-reliance. If Singapore is willing to develop a cooperative relationship in the defense industries through corporate ventures with Malaysia, both countries stand to gain economically and militarily. Malaysia will benefit from Singapore's successes and Singapore could increase its economic interaction with Malaysia. The objective of seeking self-reliance, to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers will be in the interests of both nations. It is important that this economic relationship support each nation's security interests rather than allow their stability to be disturbed by unfavourable perceptions of each other's defense strategy.

SAMCO, which maintain most of the equipment operated by the SAF, will provide a good venue for such cooperation. The company also builds and refurbishes some major items, almost to the point of remanufacture. In 1987, SAMCO implemented a project to create Super A-4 Skyhawks with GE-404 engines and advanced avionics, including head-up display (HUD). This project provides the opportunity to modernize other A-4 Skyhawks in the region, including the 37 possessed by

Malaysia.⁷ Malaysia is a potential market to Singapore in an economic perspective, but both countries could to interact beyond the economic relationship. Corporate ventures in this field could be the foundation to strengthen the bond and help build towards other common economic-military interests.

Other industries which support defence capabilities are potential areas of cooperations between the two countries. SAE, which redesigned the V200 APCs as a mobile platforms for the RBS-70 surface to air missile, could develop technical exchanges with the MAF workshops, which overhaul Malaysian armored fighting vehicles (AFV). Such proposals could raise sensitive national security concerns in terms of divulging mission readiness, but this becomes parochial when one considers the need for joint cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore to defend their geographical entity against a common hostile force. A high state of mission readiness of the AFVs from both countries are essential to counter the threat. This is where Malaysia and Singapore must close ranks and overcome parochial mindsets for the sake of mutual security.

Aerospace Industry Malaysia (AIM) of which AIROD is a subsidiary, and SAI should also establish cooperative joint ventures rather than embarked on economic and technological competition. Malaysia should acknowledge that they cannot capture the aerospace market in the region. SAI has already gained international recognition from Lockheed Corporation of Georgia as a capable servicing center in the region.⁸ If

Lockheed showed interest in the Malaysian joint venture, it could also share the regional market alongside SAI through bilateral cooperation with AIROD to secure Lockheed recognition. This may be a sensitive issue for some Malaysians who want to see the Malaysian aerospace industry achieve the status of SAI. It will be a bitter pill to swallow when forced to admit the venture is approaching a dead end. However, it will be better to divert resources into other avenues and take a detour towards the ultimate objective. The technological advances and recognition achieved by SAI are well established, but the amicable atmosphere promoted by the present leaders provide an alternative approach for Malaysia to pursue.

In the realm of direct military interaction, the concepts of interoperability, optimization of assets and common logistics will benefit both countries.⁹ Interoperability has long been advocated, but seldom employed due to the non-permissive atmosphere that existed. Furthermore, there is no agreement which explicitly demands the employment of such procedures. Since early 1980s, Malaysia and Singapore have signed numerous MOUs to cover specific arrangements whenever demanded by the AD exercise scenario organized by IADS. In contrast, the Malaysian-Indonesian bilateral agreement promulgated in the combined Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) what interoperability between the two countries air forces was to be achieved. A similar commitment to interoperability must be established if Malaysia and Singapore are to practice any

kind of combined defense system. Currently, Singapore has forty-two F5E/F and seventy-six A-4 Skyhawks, while Malaysia has twenty-one F5E/F and thirty-seven A-4 Skyhawks. This commonality of equipment will simplify the task of defining interoperability through bilateral SOPs that satisfy the operational combat support requirement of both nations.

Optimization of assets is another objective of military cooperation that can benefit the services of both nations. The employment of assets in AD exercises has demonstrated how integrated operations can enhance defence of the two countries. The early-warning information, acquired by the E-2C Hawkeye AWAC, when shared with Malaysian AD sector in the north, will extend the time and space for optimal employment of AD fighters stationed on ground alert. The information will also help maritime operations, where cooperation is vital considering the littoral nature of both countries. Operating procedures that segregate assets will not support a concept of geographical indivisibility.

Related to interoperability and optimization of assets is the benefit of common logistic supportability. Reliability and maintainability are two important aspects of logistics that will benefit the military-economic interests of both countries.

Finally, the economic-military cooperation will contribute towards affordability in the future procurement of assets and the standardization of equipment. The high costs and other problems associated with defence purchases are

prohibitive for developing nations, even if they have healthy economic growth. It is also difficult to keep abreast of technological advances in weapon systems, and new generation equipment can rapidly become obsolete. Cooperation may ease the procurement burden when standardization of equipment can be effected and their employment optimized.¹⁰ This is an important benefit of defence cooperation which should be achieved between interdependent nations.

Key to the future success of the cooperation proposed above, as mentioned before, will be the acceptance and degree of cooperation tendered by Singapore. Their reception and reaction will be the yardstick which measure the viability of bilateral cooperation. Singapore will have to evaluate both the benefits and costs of cooperation to their national interests.

Base on one-to-one basis, the military-economic cooperation seems to benefit Malaysia more than it does for Singapore. On the other hand, from the Malaysian perspective, the cooperation is a quid-pro-quo arrangement which balances compromises of national integrity and sovereignty against recognition of the defacto concept of indivisibility within the geographical entity.

Therefore, a willingness on the part of Singapore to build greater social and economic cooperation, that is tangibly linked to defence interests could overcome the politico-military misconceptions of threats posed by the SAF,

remove the barrier of mutual anxiety and fears, and permit closer military cooperation. The acceptance of cooperation by Singapore to share its successes in defence industries will demonstrate the need of mutual supportability between small nations. Singapore will gain the intangible benefits of space, within the limits of the agreement, to work alongside its Malaysian counterpart to employ the strategy of forward defence. In the macro perspective, the military-economic enterprise supports the viability of forward defence strategy within the Malaysia-Singapore geographical entity.

However, it will take time and a positive commitment from both sides to formalize procedures which will definitely enhance the interdependent concept of regional cooperation.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEEDS FOR BILATERAL AGREEMENT

In March 1989, it was revealed by a newspaper report that the top generals of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore had attended a meeting in Bali arranged by the Indonesian Defence Minister, General Benny Moerdani.¹ Although the purpose and outcome of the meeting was not officially announced, it can be assumed that it addressed cooperation in a triangular defence relationship. The forging of such a relationship among the three countries will contribute to an atmosphere that lessen misunderstandings, misgivings and misconceptions and helps to foster regional stability.

Military bilateral agreements already exist between most members within ASEAN except, prominently, between Malaysia and Singapore. In 1968 and 1974, Malaysia arranged bilateral agreements with Thailand and Indonesia, respectively, to solve their common security problems along shared borders. Singapore-Thailand and Singapore-Indonesia bilateral agreements were later concluded in the early 1980s. However, Malaysia and Singapore remained loosely bound only within the FPDA, since a bilateral agreement was almost impossible in the 1970s, especially after the tragic racial riots of 1969. During the exercises organised by IADS, reservation and discomfort were evident between the Malaysian and the Singaporean participants.

From the point of geography, logic would argue that these two nations would be among the first to seek cooperative defence arrangements. The close cooperation between ASEAN nations has demonstrated tangible economic and military benefits. The Malaysia-Thailand bilateral arrangement has resolved, among other issues, conflicting claims about overlapping EEZs with a compromise on a common zone along their northern water boundaries. Meanwhile, Indonesia granted corridors for Malaysian aircraft and ships to ply the shortest routes between the peninsula and the Malaysian eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak. Thailand also allowed their Air Combat Maneuver Instrumentation (ACMI) range in Korat AFB to be utilized for training Malaysian and Singaporean combat pilots. Combined air and naval exercises were conducted annually to understand each others operating procedures. Malaysia and Indonesia even conducted combined exercises for the army and the police forces to curb infiltration and smuggling activities.

But, now that the relationship between the two countries has changed for the better, is it possible to conclude a bilateral agreement?

There are many issues for discussion which provide the pros and cons to the question but the "indivisibility in defence" seemed to be the one single factor that ultimately should favor the proposal. Malaysia and Singapore were never envisioned to be separated, but destiny took her course.

Article VI of AMDA stipulated,

. . . The Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Malaya on 12th October 1957, and its annexes shall apply to all territories of Malaysia, . . .² (*Italics mine*)

The text referred to Malaysia in which Singapore existed. FPDA also assumed the defence of Malaysia and Singapore as indivisible.³ The matter was complicated when Singapore became an independent nation in 1965 and went off on her separate way to formulate a defence strategy which postured threatening capabilities, purportedly out of necessity.

The concept of a single geographical area of operations has long been recognized and accepted.⁴ Even the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) viewed its "liberation struggle" to include both Malaysia and Singapore as one political entity. Leaders associated with regional security acknowledged the need for a unified defence, but political activist groups misinterpreted the intent and opposed cooperative defence activities.

The strategy of forward defence adopted by Singapore is a de facto recognition that defence of the peninsula cannot be separated. The statement that "an attack on Malaysia constitute an attack on Singapore" recognises that Malaysia and Singapore are in one single area of defence--dictated by the geographical entity.⁵ The lesson learned from the British during World War Two was that the two countries should gear

their defence planning to meet the threat at the furthest northern point on the Malaysian peninsula. Unfortunately, the absence of bilateral agreement led to the development of the strategy in isolation by Singapore without consultation with Malaysia, on whose territory the employment of the concept would take place. The strategy can be realized, but it should be on the invitation of the Malaysian Government based on the existence of some form of arrangement.

The FPDA has provided links in a non-sensitive way. This would have been more difficult if confined to a strictly bilateral environment during the days when Malaysia and Singapore were developing their forces. The organisation has been an effective vehicle for multi-national military interactions, but regional security development in the 1990s necessitates a closer and more substantive Malaysia-Singapore defence arrangement. IADS can continue to serve as a basis for training and combined exercises, and play the anchor role in the event a coalition defence force is required to defend the region.

The renewed commitment by the ANZUK partners after the AD exercise "Lima Bersatu" in 1988 should strengthen FPDA as an instrument of defence linkage within the region.* The Australian interest in deploying the F-18 Hornets to the region and the British withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997 could elevate the FPDA into a more meaningful alliance. The British showed their renewed interest in the FPDA when they again deploy their

Tornado aircraft in 1990 to participate in the IADS AD exercise. There is also a possibility that the British will host an FPDA land exercise in Malaysia in 1991.

Despite this positive development of the FPDA, the immediate concern of Malaysia and Singapore should be addressed in a conclusive bilateral agreement. Malaysia and Singapore must be aware that regardless of the provisions and future status of the FPDA, the other partners will only come to the region so long as it serves their interest to do so. There is a need to plan for this contingency, and develop closer cooperations between the local operational commanders. It is pertinent to consider an alternate bilateral agreement and discuss the appropriate level of cooperation between the two nations.

CHAPTER IX

LEVELS OF COOPERATION

If the need for bilateral cooperation is accepted, there are still many issues and problems that may inhibit rather than encourage the process. A sense of responsibility to preserve national integrity may restrict the leadership from exploiting the full potential of the cooperation to optimally employ the available military forces. However, even a cautious effort is better than no effort, as long as there is an incremental progress towards better military cooperation.

On a bilateral basis, military cooperation can range from a common defence policy to mere exchanges of information, combined exercises, and coordinated operations. A common defence policy can include common doctrines, combined command and control, and standardized procedures.¹ In the military-economic sphere, corporate endeavors related to interoperability and optimization of assets can extend to common purchases or joint production of military equipment.

While the current atmosphere does offer possibilities for change, it must be accepted that change can only be gradual and that for political reasons national priorities will often take precedence. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, their national leaders have established a positive relationship, but allaying the public anxiety will still be a problem.

Military leaders have also established a good rapport through social contacts. The MAF and SAF have organised annual

golf championships for military members and selected civilian personalities from both countries. This golf diplomacy is being expanded to become the vehicle for better rapport among ASEAN military personalities, with the first ASEAN Military Golf Championship scheduled for April 1990.² Interactions on the golf "greens" contribute immensely to the present amicable relationship. The challenge will be to translate positive working relationships into concrete actions that improve defence cooperation.

A common defence policy would be the best military option to satisfy the geographical defence entity of the two countries. This concept was promulgated in ANZAM and AMDA, but has not reached full realisation within FPDA. The situation was different under ANZAM and AMDA when the ANZUK partners were committed to defend a single country, while under FPDA the two countries being defended are concerned with their respective sovereignty and national integrity.

A combined doctrine will allow both countries to formulate comprehensive strategies to counter the common threat, but political and social constraints will restrict the options for implementation. Singapore AMX-13 tanks and V200 APCs rolling across the causeway will not be a welcome sight to the local Malay population because they "conjure the idea of invasion by the other's troops".³ The recent signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Singapore and Indonesia that provides land training facilities in Indonesia

for the SAF at the new joint Air Weapon Range at Siabu in Sumatra, represents a positive effort to overcome traditional ethnic divisions in the region.⁴ The relations will inevitably help mitigate Malaysian fears and pave the path for Malaysian and Singaporean ground forces to conduct combined training maneuvers.

Nonetheless, the firmly embedded antimosities will require time to dilute through education and political compromises. The economic-military cooperation discussed in Chapter Seven would pacify the process of acceptance and understanding. Until then, bilateral arrangements can work on AD and maritime combined operations, along the same lines as exercised under IADS, but confined to Malaysia and Singapore only.

The existence of the IADS headquarters might be considered redundant to a new Malaysia-Singapore combined headquarters. IADS is the key operational link for FPDA, and thus, has a strong political implication. Nevertheless, a parallel organization to coordinate Malaysia and Singapore combined interests is desirable. The AD and maritime requirements of both countries demand the close coordination between local commanders. It would be more realistic for the respective Malaysian and Singaporean theater commanders to employ their combined forces in routine operations.

It is imperative for the two nations to optimize their employment of maritime assets to patrol the EEZ. Although

Singapore is almost landlocked by Malaysia and Indonesia, her interests in safeguarding her harbors and SLOC should justify her involvement.³ There is even a possibility of a trilateral arrangement in maritime operations with Indonesia, who also has legitimate and strong security interests in the region.

In AD operations, a combined command headquarters, similar to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), is probably a good model for establishing an integrated, forward defense system for the two nations.⁴ Combined operations in which Singaporean forces would be assigned to a Malaysian sector commander in the north, and vice versa, would achieve Singaporean objectives of a forward defence in depth without the negative political cost of violating Malaysian airspace. At the same time, the concept of interoperability and other related aspects of cooperation will be exercised. This would be a clear demonstration that the philosophy of a unified defence of the peninsula had been accepted. This working relationship should be a continuous bilateral operation, while the IADS provides the multilateral requirement whenever the situation demands.

Malaysia and Singapore should not be overly dependant on the support of the other ANZUK partners. History has proven that the commitment of non-national forces is normally commensurate with the vested interests of their government and permissive condition on their home front. These facts were demonstrated by the British nonchalance attitude to defend

Malaya in 1941 and the US disengagement from Vietnam in 1974. With the winds of peace blowing across the world, there is a possibility of reduced commitment to a conflict with the Warsaw Pact, and UK forces may be available for deployment to this region. Even then, Malaysia and Singapore must continue to support each other because, ultimately, their survivability will depend on their own military resources.

It would also be natural for both countries to pursue a policy of self-reliance in military-economic cooperation for joint development of military industries. Singapore is in a position to help Malaysia along the road of mutual success. They have developed industries which have the capability to sustain combat forces. Development of Malaysian industries will further enhance these capabilities. Cooperation in the service and combat support areas could also be worked out between the appropriate counterparts to form the logistic lines to any zone of operations.

Malaysia and Singapore must survive the uncertainties of the 1990s. There is no better way to promote their respective security interests than to cooperate within a bilateral agreement. It is hoped that the political and social interplay will not jeopardize an opportunity to enhance the regional stability.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

The future defence posture of Malaysia and Singapore is directly related to the external and internal threat influences discussed in Chapters Four and Five respectively. The superpower interplay in the region will bear positively on regional stability. Since the strategic confrontation between the super powers has been relaxed, the omens in the region are favorable.

The Malta summit between President Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev on 3 December 1989, had both of them smiling. Gorbachev told reporters that,

. . . many things that were characteristic of the Cold War should be abandoned. . . . the arms race, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle should be the things of the past.¹

The statement was not conclusive, but if the USSR genuinely ceases belligerent and aggressive behavior, there is no fear for a global conflict unless the US becomes the bully.

The PRC has been involved in regional politics since she emerged as a militant socialist state bent on exporting revolution to the rest of the world. But, she has focussed her attention on Southeast Asia.² Malaysia is worried about the intrusions of the Chinese in the South China Sea which affect the security of her maritime and seabed resources. Much of Malaysia's oil and gas resources are offshore and vulnerable to

naval and air strikes. Singapore's maritime interest do not go beyond her harbors and SLOC, but their well being is interrelated to the Malaysian requirement.

The differences in policies and the inherent ethnic issue which dominates Malaysia and Singapore relationship could destabilize the security ideals of both countries. It is in the context of mutual interests that a Malaysia-Singapore bilateral agreement is urgently needed to oversee jointly the integrity of the maritime region which contributes to the regional security of Southeast Asia. Singapore's strategy of forward defence employed within the Malaysia-Singapore geographical entity, further supports the requirement for the close military cooperation between the two nations.

In regional security, the governments of Southeast Asian countries must remain moderate and continue the existing cooperation within the ASEAN framework to maintain the prevailing peaceful atmosphere. Their armed forces must endeavor to develop roughly in parallel, without anyone predominating, to avoid an arms race. If the changing world environment is favorable, it does not mean there is less need for security cooperation, because a complacent posture will not be enough to ensure the region is secure. It seems imperative, therefore, that regional security cooperation be given more substance. As ASEAN develops, it will be appropriate for the bilateral cooperation to be stepped up and eventually develop into a trilateral or quadrilateral. This will take time and

require an in-depth appraisal between the practitioners and the policy planners.

This study has attempted to answer the questions that cloud the political-military relationship between Malaysia and Singapore, and could continue to affect the defence cooperations of the region through the 1990s. First, what is the future for FPDA? The essence of the analysis supports favorably the FPDA's viability to augment the defence posture of Malaysia and Singapore. FPDA provides the political and psychological deterrence by way of linkages to the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The visible contributions of the ANZUK partners in deploying aircraft and ships to the region and participating in integrated exercises serves an important factor for the stability in the region. However, there is also the need for operational commanders from the two countries to interact continuously to secure, on a bilateral basis, their integrity within a geographical entity.

Second, the amicable relationship of the current leaders supports the potential for the bilateral arrangement. This study discussed the complex ethnic, socio-economic and political problems inherited from the colonial legacy which have restricted interactions in the past. A closer rapport will allay these anxieties and apprehensions. Tangible benefits from the corresponding economic-military interface will reinforce confidence and prevent negative reactions from the socio-political activist group. Economic-military cooperation

will also provide other parallel prospects to improve relationships. The permissive atmosphere, both externally and internally, must be exploited for economic and social prosperity. The two countries could not afford to indulge in petty squabbles over issues that could become detrimental to internal security and regional stability. Therefore, the potential for Malaysia-Singapore defence cooperation in a bilateral agreement is strong.

Third, the study concluded that a bilateral agreement incorporating pure military operational substance will not benefit Malaysian security interests without the economic-military interface in defence industries. Malaysia would compromise its national integrity by accepting the defacto forward defence strategy adopted by Singapore as part of a geographical defence entity. This would be done at the risk of agitating the socio-political spectrum. However, in the interest of regional security and bilateral cooperation, the quid-pro-quo arrangement would serve the best interests of both nations.

The following recommendations are proposed to enhance the defence cooperations of Malaysia and Singapore in the 1990s:

- * FPDA continue for as long as the partners are prepared to maintain their commitment. Beside its security value, it is a useful support for bilateral defence cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore

- * Develop a parallel headquarters modelled on NORAD Headquarters to manage real-time employment of combined AD assets.

- * Organise Combined Working Teams to study the feasibility of incorporating the much desired economic-military interface in the defense industries.


- * Develop a near-term plan to provide the initial vehicle towards the long term objective. The most conducive area to develop concepts of combined exercises and operations is with the air and maritime forces since their involvement is less obvious to populace.

- * Pursue a common defence policy as an ultimate objective to satisfy the concept of indivisibility within a geographical entity.

Malaysia and Singapore must face the reality of the complex relationship that influence their existence. It will be in the best interests of the two nations to cooperate, and formulate a viable defence posture for the 1990s.

APPENDIX: A

MAP OF MALAYSIA



APPENDIX: B

ANGLO-MALAYSIA DEFENSE AGREEMENT, 1963

Adopted in Kuala Lumpur on July 9, 1963.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore;
Desiring to conclude an agreement relating to Malaysia;
Agree as follows:--

ARTICLE I

The Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak and the State of Singapore shall be federated with the existing States of the Federation of Malaya as the States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore in accordance with the constitutional instruments annexed to this Agreement and the Federation shall thereafter be called "Malaysia".

ARTICLE II

The Government of the Federation of Malaya will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment by the Parliament of the Federation of Malaya of an Act in the form set out in Annex A to this Agreement and that it is brought into operation on 31st August, 1963 (and the date on which the said Act is brought into operation is hereinafter referred to as "Malaysia Day").

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United Kingdom will submit to Her Britannic Majesty before Malaysia Day Orders in Council for the purpose of giving the force of law Constitutions Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore as States of Malaysia which are set out in Annexes B, C, and D to this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United Kingdom will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of an Act providing for the relinquishment, as from Malaysia Day, of Her Britannic Majesty's sovereignty and jurisdiction in respect of North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore so that the said sovereignty and jurisdiction shall on such relinquishment vest in accordance with this Agreement and the constitutional instruments annexed to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the Federation of Malaya will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment before Malaysia Day by the Parliament of the Federation of Malaya of an Act in the form set out in Annex E to this Agreement for the purpose of extending and adapting the Immigration Ordinance, 1959, of the Federation of Malaya to Malaysia and of making additional provision with respect to entry into the States of Sabah and Sarawak; and the other provisions of this Agreement shall be conditional upon the enactment of the said Act.

ARTICLE VI

The Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Malaya of 12th October, 1957, and its annexes shall apply to all territories of Malaysia, and any reference in that Agreement to the Federation of Malaya shall be deemed to apply to Malaysia, subject to the proviso that the Government of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the Government of the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as that Government may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and the Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia. The application of the said Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of Annex F to this Agreement (relating primarily to Service lands in Singapore).

ARTICLE VII

(1) The Federation of Malaya agrees that Her Britannic Majesty may make before Malaysia Day Orders in Council in the form set out in Annex G, to this Agreement for the purpose of making provision for the payment of compensation and retirement benefits to certain overseas officers serving, immediately before Malaysia Day, in the public service of the Colony of North Borneo or the Colony of Sarawak.

(2) On or as soon as practicable after Malaysia Day, Public Officers' Agreements in the forms set out in Annexes H and I of this Agreement shall be signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaysia; and the Government of Malaysia shall obtain the concurrence of the Government of the State of Sabah, Sarawak or Singapore, as the case may require, to the signature of the Agreement by the Government of Malaysia so far as its terms may affect the responsibilities or interests of the Government of the State.

ARTICLE VIII

The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak will take such legislative, executive or other action as may be required to implement the assurances, undertakings and recommendations contained in Chapter 3 of, and Annexes A and B to, the Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee signed on 27th February, 1963, in so far as they are not implemented by express provision of the Constitution of Malaysia.

ARTICLE IX

The provisions of Annex J to this Agreement relating to Common Market and financial arrangements shall constitute an Agreement between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of Singapore.

ARTICLE X

The Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of Singapore will take such legislative, executive or other action as may be required to implement the arrangements with respect to broadcasting and television set out in Annex K to this Agreement in so far as they are not implemented by express provision of the Constitution of Malaysia.

ARTICLE XI

This Agreement shall be signed in the English and Malay languages except that the Annexes shall be in the English language only. In case of doubt the English text of the Agreement shall prevail.

Reproduced from: Haas, Michael. Basic Documents of Asian

Regional Organisation (Dobbs Ferry, New York:

Oceana Publication, Inc. 1974)

APPENDIX: C

FIVE-POWER DEFENSE MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE, 1971

Adopted in London on April 16, 1971, at the Five Power Ministerial Meeting.

Ministers of the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met in London on 15 and 16 April 1971 in order to consider matters of common interest to all five governments relating to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore.

The Ministers of the five governments affirmed, the basic principles of their discussions, their continuing determination to work together for peace and stability, their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all countries, and their belief in the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In the context of their governments' determination to continue to co-operate closely in defence arrangements which are based on the need to regard *the defence of Malaysia and Singapore as indivisible*, the ministers noted with gratification the development of the defence capability of Malaysia and Singapore, to which the other three governments had given assistance, and the decisions of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which had been welcomed by the other two governments, to continue to station forces there after the end of 1971. (*Italics mine*)

In discussion of the contribution which each of the five governments would make to defence arrangements in Malaysia and Singapore, the Ministers noted the view of the United Kingdom Government that the nature of its commitment under the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement required review and that that agreement should be replaced by new political arrangements.

They declared that their governments would continue to co-operate, in accordance with their respective policies, in the field of defence after the termination of the agreement on 1 November 1971.

The Ministers also declared, in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their government would immediately *consult together* for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat. (*Italics mine*)

The Ministers reviewed the progress made regarding the establishment of the new defence arrangements. In particular:

(a) They welcomed the practical steps being taken to establish the integrated air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore on 1 September 1971.

(b) They agreed to establish an air defence council, comprising one senior representative of each of the five nations, to be responsible for the functioning of the integrated air defence system, and to provide direction to the commander of the integrated air defence system on matters affecting the organisation, training and development and operational readiness of the system.

(c) They noted the progress made by the Five Power Naval Advisory Working Group.

(d) They decided to set up a joint consultative council to provide a forum for regular consultation at the senior official level on matters relating to the defence arrangements.

Ministers also noted that further discussion would take place between governments on the practical arrangements required for the accommodation and facilities for the ANZUK forces to be stationed in the area.

They looked forward to the early and successful conclusion of these discussions as an essential basis for the completion of plans for the new defence arrangements.

The Ministers agreed that from time to time it might be appropriate for them to meet to discuss their common interests. It would also be open to any of the participating governments to request at any time, with due notice, a meeting to review these defence arrangements.

Reproduced from: Haas, Michael. Basic Documents of Asian

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GLOSSARY

ACMI	aircraft combat maneuver instrumentation
AD	air defence
AFV	armored fighting vehicle
AIN	aerospace industries Malaysia
AIROD	aircraft repair and overhaul depot
AMDA	Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand and Malaya
ANZUK	Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom
APC	armored personnel carrier
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	anti-submarine-warfare
AWAC	airborne warning and command
CIS	chartered industries of Singapore
CSR	commonwealth strategic reserve
EEZ	exclusive economic zone
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
HUD	head up display
IADS	integrated air defence system
ISA	internal security act
LIC	low intensity conflict
LLFA	low level flying area

MAF	Malaysian armed forces
MCP	Malaysian communist party
MSE	Malaysian shipyard engineering
NEP	new economic policy
NORAD	North American aerospace defence command
ODE	ordnance development and engineering
OIC	organisation of Islamic conference
PERISTA	perkembangan istimewa angkatan tentera
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force
RMN	Royal Malaysian Navy
RSAF	Republic of Singapore Air Force
SAE	Singapore automotive engineering
SAF	Singapore armed forces
SAI	Singapore aircraft industry
SAMCO	Singapore aerospace maintenance company
SEA	Southeast Asia
SIA	Singapore international airlines
SLOC	sea lines of communication
SOP	standard operating procedures
SSE	Singapore shipbuilding and engineering
STC	Singapore technological corporation
TPA	track production area
UMNO	United Malay National Organisation
ZOPFAN	zone of peace, freedom and neutrality